Institutional ownership and monitoring: Evidence from financial misreporting

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Are There Monitoring Benefits to Institutional Ownership? Evidence from Seasoned Equity Offerings (2011, unknown): “In fact, in their study of financial misreporting, Burns et al. (2010) report direct evidence that concentration induces greater monitoring by institutions.”
Blockholders: A Survey of Theory and Evidence (2017, unknown): “Bushee and Goodman (2007) find the private information content of an institutional investor’s trade increases in his stake.”
Do Industry-Specialist Auditors Influence Stock Price Crash Risk? (2015, unknown): “, transient institutional ownership) that might lead to some unfavorable outcomes such as financial misreporting (Burns et al. 2010).”
Does the impact of board independence on large bank risks change after the global financial crisis (2017, background): “Institutional shareholders are supposed to have a larger capability to monitor managers (Agrawal and Mandelker, 1990; Burns et al., 2010) and larger diversification opportunities than other shareholders.”
Effect of institutional ownership on dividends: An agency-theory-based analysis (2016, unknown): “For each firm that has non-missing and non-zero institutional ownership, we calculate the ratio of shares owned by the 10 largest shareholders to the total shares outstanding as our measure of ownership concentration (Top10own), similar to Burns, Kedia, and Lipson (2010).”