Payout Policy, Agency Conflicts, and Corporate Governance

By Kose John, A. Knyazeva. 2006

189 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/64776dc598267578168894dd33cb87f60768a494

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Citations in the corpus

Does Corporate Board Diversity Affect Corporate Payout Policy (2016, unknown): “effective means of mitigating agency conflict due to governance (John and Knyazeva, 2006).”
Payout Policy Choices and Shareholder Investment Horizons (2013, result): “This result differs from that of John and Knyazeva (2006) that report an insignificant coefficient in a similar type regression.”
Effect of institutional ownership on dividends: An agency-theory-based analysis (2016, background): “Managers state that they will pass up positive net present value projects before cutting dividends, but do not make the same claim about repurchases (Brav, Graham, Harvey, and Michaely, 2005; John and Knyazeva, 2006).”
Women in Top Management and Agency Costs (2011, background): “John and Knyazeva (2006) show that dividend and total payouts (the sum of dividends and repurchases) are significantly more when firms have poor governance that may be indicated by large boards, CEO/chairman duality, and low ownership by insiders and institutional investors.”
Corporate Governance and Firm Cash Holdings (2006, unknown): “8 antitakeover provisions have higher debt ratios than those with low provisions, while John and Knyazeva (2006) find that the GIndex is related to firm payout policy.”
Corporate Payout Policy and Product Market Competition (2007, unknown): “Officer (2006) uses firms with large boards, CEO/Chairman duality, and low ownership by insiders and institutional investors as a proxy for poor governance, and John and Knyazeva (2006) use the Ishii, Gompers, and Metrick (2003) index as a proxy for external governance.”
Dividend Payouts and Corporate Governance Quality: An Empirical Investigation (2011, unknown): “Given the negative market reaction to dividend cuts and infrequent deviations from dividend policy, dividends help constrain the manager through high cost of deviation and constitute an effective pre-commitment mechanism in the presence of a severe agency conflict (John and Knyazeva, 2006).”
Corporate governance and firm cash holdings in the US (2008, background): “Cross-country evidence shows that greater shareholder rights are associated with lower cash holdings (Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith, and Servaes, 2003; Lins and Kalcheva, 2004; Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson, 2004). This suggests that shareholders want managers to disgorge cash (presumably to the sharehold”
CEO Power, Government Monitoring, and Bank Dividends (2016, background): “…weak dividends act as a pre-commitment device: a promise to regularly pay cash to shareholders reduces agency costs since it reduces the likelihood that these funds will be wasted on projects that increase the private beneﬁts of CEOs without maximizing shareholder value ( John and Knyazeva, 2006 ).”
Capital Structure, CEO Dominance, and Corporate Performance (2011, unknown): “A similar technique based on industry structure is employed by a number of recent studies including John and Knyazeva (2006), Knyazeva (2009), and John and Kadyrzhanova (2008).”