Does Executive Portfolio Structure Affect Risk Management? CEO Risk-taking Incentives and Corporate Derivatives Usage

By Daniel A. Rogers. 2002

249 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/63cffa07051edc8e57646c256228e67add3ca7f1

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Citations in the corpus

Risk management and firm value: recent theory and evidence (2016, background): “RM studies (Smithson and Simkins, 2005) to summarize the empirical and theoretical advances that have been made in this area over the past decade. To provide context for the recent empirical and theoretical studies that we survey, a brief recap of the early RM theory literature is appropriate. Stulz”
The Cost Efficiency of Takaful Insurance Companies (2010, unknown): “30 Rogers (2002).”
Does Hedging Affect Firm Value? Evidence from the US Airline Industry (2006, unknown): “Allayannis and Ofek (2001), Berkman and Bradbury (1996), Dolde (1995), Gay and Nam (1998), Geczy, Minton, and Schrand (1997), Graham and Rogers (2002), Haushalter (2000), Mian (1996), Nance, Smith, and Smithson (1993), Rogers (2002) , Schrand and Unal (1998), and Tufano (1996), are many of the publ”
Does Fuel Hedging Make Economic Sense? The Case of the US Airline Industry (2002, unknown): “However, Graham and Rogers (2002) find that such tax savings have no power to explain hedging behavior by a large cross-section of firms.”
Industry Tournament Incentives (2018, unknown): “…wealth-performance sensitivity since the early 1990s (Jensen and Murphy (1990)), on executive risk-taking incentives starting 10 years later (Rogers (2002); Coles Daniel, and Naveen (2006)), and more recently on internal tournament incentives for executives (Kale, Reis, and Venkateswaran…”
Hedging Behavior in Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises: The Role of Unobserved Heterogeneity (2004, unknown): “The combined work of Froot et al. (1993), Nance et al. (1993), Mian (1996), Tufano (1996, 1998), G eczy et al. (1997), Lee and Hoyt (1997), Koski and Pontiff (1999) and recently Graham and Rogers (2002), and Rogers (2002) among others provide a discussion of these factors.”
Managerial Incentives and Risk-taking (2006, methodology): “With the exception of Rogers (2002) and Nam et al. (2003), prior studies tend to focus on one dimension of compensation”
CEO Risk-Related Incentives and Income Smoothing (2009, unknown): “To validate our measure of Vegadelta, we compare it with that of Rogers (2002), who calculates it somewhat differently (including shares owned in the denominator), and our measures are comparable with this adjustment.”
CEO Compensation and Corporate Risk: Evidence from a Natural Experiment (2013, unknown): “A number of papers approach this question by estimating a system of simultaneous equations (see Coles et al., 2006; Rajgopal and Shevlin, 2002; Rogers 2002).”
The Characteristics of Firms That Hire Chief Risk Officers (2010, unknown): “We compute Vega and Delta for each CEO’s stock and option portfolio and use the ratio (as in Rogers, 2002) of the two variables – Vega to Delta as our proxy for the CEO’s risk taking incentives.7 The full details of the comp of Vega and Delta are contained in the appendix.”
CORPORATE HEDGING AND SHAREHOLDER VALUE (2010, methodology): “This might be explained by the fact that the tax incentive to hedge in order to increase leverage is larger than the tax incentive of progressivity (Graham and Rogers, 2002; Graham and Smith, 1999).”