Tax Competition and Economic Geography

By R. Forslid, Fredrik Andersson. 2003

254 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics, Political Science and International Relations

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/62a7f29a7cb7b04b769df4a2678848f4bdb9c21c

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Citations in the corpus

The new economic geography: Past, present and the future (2003, background): “…Tiebout-type inter-jurisdictional competition (in taxation and the provision of local public goods) into core-periphery models has been achieved recently by several people such as Baldwin and Krugman (2000), Kind et al. (2000), and Anderson and Forslid (2003) (Baldwin et al. 2003, Chapters 15–16).”
How Does FDI React to Corporate Taxation? (2005, background): “Finally, tax differentials can be an equilibrium outcome in an imperfect competition setting combining economies of scale with trade costs and/or agglomeration forces (Haufler and Wooton, 1999; Andersson and Forslid, 2003; Baldwin and Krugman, 2004; Ludema and Wooton, 2000).”
Agglomeration and Tax Competition (2006, unknown): “Hence, in contrast to standard international tax-competition results, closer integration may first result in a ‘race to the top’ before leading to a ‘race to the bottom’ (Baldwin and Krugman, 2004). The contribution of the present paper is to push the analysis of tax competition with agglomeration a”
Do Agglomeration Economies Reduce the Sensitivity of Firm Location to Tax Differentials (2012, unknown): “This will lead to a particular specification of the profit function that can be viewed as an alternative to equation (1), thus offering a complementary framework for the exploration of our basic research question.”
Frontiers of the New Economic Geography (2005, methodology): “For 17 example, the introduction of Tiebout-type inter-jurisdictional competition (in taxation and the provision of local public goods) into core-periphery models has been achieved recently by several authors such as Baldwin and Krugman [12], Kind, Midelfart-Knarvik and Schjelderup [89], and Anderso”
The structure of simple 'New Economic Geography' models (or, On identical twins) (2005, background): “, Andersson and Forslid (2003), Baldwin et al. (2003a), Kind et al. (2000), and Ludema and Wooton (2000). On the political economics of regional subsidies, see Robert-Nicoud and Sbergami (2004). 7 This is by no means a trivial task because the expression for the sustain point is a non-linear, implic”
Do Governments Tax Agglomeration Rents? (2013, background): “These agglomeration economies reduce the interregional mobility of capital and allow agglomeration-hosting governments to set a high corporate tax rate without triggering an immediate capital outflow even if capital is in principle highly mobile (see Ludema and Wooton (2000), Andersson and Forslid (”
A Simple, Analytically Solvable Chamberlinian Agglomeration Model (2004, unknown): “An analytically solvable case of the CP model has been worked out by Forslid (1999), however.2 Due to its solvability, this model has proven useful for analyses in the field of capital and income tax competition (Andersson and Forslid, 1999; Baldwin and Krugman, 2000).”
WHAT DO WE KNOW ABOUT CORPORATE TAX COMPETITION? (2013, background): “…economic geography models which include explicit modelling of agglomeration forces has been studied in a number of papers, for example, Ludema and Wooton (2000), Kind, Midelfart-Knarvik and Schjelderup (2000), Andersson and Forslid (2003), Baldwin and Krugman (2004) and reviewed by Forslid (2005).”