Ownership Structure, Discretionary Accruals and the Informativeness of Earnings
By J. P. Sánchez‐Ballesta, Emma García‐Meca. 2007
160 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Finance
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/61ec53c6cf9809f152ac59929c30ec95f5f6f428
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Accounting
- Emma García‐Meca
- J. P. Sánchez‐Ballesta
- Jesus Sáenz González
- Brossa Wong
- C. Man
- Zongjun Wang
- M. A. Gulzar
- Qutaiba F. Hijazi
In Finance
Citations in the corpus
- Corporate Governance and Earnings Management: A Survey of Literature (2013, result): “Sánchez-Ballesta and García-Meca (2007) provide recent evidence that a lower level of insider ownership is associated with less earnings management, which is consistent with previous studies.”
- Corporate Governance and Earnings Management: A Meta‐Analysis (2009, methodology): “Davidson et al. (2005) and Sánchez-Ballesta and García-Meca (2007b) do not find any significant relation.”
- Corporate Governance Quality and Earnings Management: Evidence from Jordan (2016, background): “…due to the increased monitoring by analysts and investors to these companies comparing with small firms that have more opportunities to engage in earnings management practices (Richardson, 1990; Lee & Choi, 2002; Sánchez-Ballesta & García-Meca, 2007; Prior et al. 2008; González & García-Meca 2014).”
- Corporate Governance Characteristics and Earnings Management: Empirical Evidence from Chinese Listed Firms (2011, background): “Koh, 2003, Bowen et al, 2004, Davidson et al. (2005) and Sánchez-Ballesta and García-Meca (2007) found no significant association between concentrated ownership and earnings management.”
- Does Corporate Governance Influence Earnings Management in Latin American Markets? (2014, background): “Our findings also have important policy implications since they support the opinion that the full application of the Anglo-Saxon corporate governance model is inappropriate (Sanchez-Ballesta and Garcia-Meca 2007) and they contribute to the literature by extending the research into the effects of cor”