Individual Preferences for Giving
By Raymond J. Fisman, Shachar Kariv, Daniel B Markovits. 2005
496 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, General Decision Sciences, Safety Research
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/60a486bbcb687d7b99bb2907fbd3eb99a48acac2
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Economics and Econometrics
- Dan Silverman
- Wieland Mueller
- Syngjoo Choi
- Shachar Kariv
- C. Null
- L. Schechter
- Ethan Ligon
- Alexander Vostroknutov
In General Decision Sciences
- Dan Silverman
- Wieland Mueller
- Christoph Engel
- Syngjoo Choi
- Daniel Friedman
- Steven Gjerstad
- Shachar Kariv
- C. Null
In Safety Research
- Christoph Engel
- Daniel Friedman
- Steven Gjerstad
- Syngjoo Choi
- Dan Silverman
- L. Schechter
- C. Null
- Ethan Ligon
Citations in the corpus
- Who Is (More) Rational (2014, methodology): “It is of course possible that presenting choice problems graphically biases choice behavior in some particular way–and that is a useful topic for experiment–but there is no evidence that this is the case, as emphasized by Choi et al. (2007b) and Fisman et al. (2007).”
- Dictator games: a meta study (2011, background): “…Ellingsen et al. 2007; Brosig, Riechmann et al. 2007; Cappelen, Hole et al. 2007; Chaudhuri and Gangadharan 2007; Fisman, Kariv et al. 2007; Fong 2007; Knafo and Israel 2007; List 2007; Stanton 2007; Vanberg 2007; Whitt and Wilson 2007; Ahmed 2008; Ahmed and Salas 2008; Asheim, Helland et…”
- A tractable model of reciprocity and fairness (2007, background): “2 Fisman et al. (2005) recently considered CES and more general convex preferences to explain choices in dictator games.”
- NORMS MAKE PREFERENCES SOCIAL: Norms Make Preferences Social (2015, background): “1 In support of models defining preferences over payoff distributions, there is evidence that many people trade off own and others’ payoffs so that other-regarding behavior is sensitive to its “price” (see, e.g., Andreoni and Miller 2002; Fisman et al. 2007).”
- Social Preferences and Strategic Uncertainty: An Experiment on Markets and Contracts (2010, unknown): “sense, we can use evidence from P1 to estimate the distributional preferences parameters of ( 3 ), αi and βi.”
- A within-subject analysis of other-regarding preferences (2011, unknown): “Fisman et al. (2007) deepen Andreoni and Miller’s (2002) analysis.”
- Do Markets Erode Social Responsibility (2015, background): “…animal cruelty, unsafe working conditions and persistent inequality, many scholars have raised the question of whether the inherent nature of market exchange has a perverting influence on people’s motivations to exhibit concern for the social impact of their actions (Bowles, 1998; Sandel, 2012;…”
- Temporal stability and psychological foundations of cooperation preferences (2012, unknown): “(2008), Herrmann and Thöni (2009), Thöni et al.”
- Motives for sharing in social networks (2012, methodology): “These correlations among motives may reflect actual variation in dictator ‘types’ as described by Fisman et al. (2007). For example, it may well be that some individuals engage both in the kind of conditional generosity one might associate with reciprocity and the unconditional generosity which woul”
- Warm glow, information, and inefficient charitable giving (2011, result): “This is similar to the rate of violations in Andreoni and Miller (2002) but much lower than the rate of violations in Fisman et al. (2007), likely because the former paper observed choices under 8-11 budget sets whereas the latter observed choices under 50 dierent budget sets.”
- How did distributional preferences change during the Great Recession (2015, unknown): “Following Andreoni and Miller (2002) and Fisman et al. (2007), we estimate constant elasticity of substitution (CES) utility function over the payouts to self and other, which makes it possible to distinguish indexical selfishness from equality-efficiency tradeoffs in a particularly convenient form.”