Simple versus optimal mechanisms

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Revenue maximization with a single sample (2010, background): “Approximation in the revenue benchmark framework discussed in the introduction is strictly stronger than the simultaneous approximation goal pursued in the present paper; this fact is made explicit in [10] and is pursued further in [4, 11, 12].”
The sample complexity of revenue maximization (2014, background): “[6, 14]) or even, when there is no bidder with a unique valuation distribution, with no dependence on the valuation distributions [7, 8, 18].”
Prophet Inequalities with Limited Information (2013, methodology): “In [14], the authors ﬁrst remove every bidder who does not meet their reserve, and then run the welfare maximizing mechanism.”
Multi-parameter mechanism design and sequential posted pricing (2010, background): “Formally, a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanismVp with reserve pricesp serves the setS of agents, with vi ≥ pi for all i ∈ S, that maximizes ∑ i∈S vi. Hartline and Roughgarden [13] show that in several single-parameter settings the VCG mechanism with monopoly reserve prices gives a constant factor”