Preventing Memory Error Exploits with WIT

By P. Akritidis, Cristian Cadar, Costin Raiciu, Manuel Costa, Miguel Oom Temudo de Castro. IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, 2008

349 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Electrical and Electronic Engineering, Signal Processing

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/5f8bbc28027342b16df77fa1b9a1efe4628d41dc

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Citations in the corpus

Code-pointer integrity (2014, methodology): “Write integrity testing (WIT) [3] provides spatial memory safety by restricting pointer writes according to points-to sets obtained by an over-approximate static analysis (and is therefore limited by the static analysis).”
CETS: compiler enforced temporal safety for C (2010, methodology): “Examples include: control flow integrity [3], dataflow integrity based on reaching definition analysis calculated statically [9], or using pointer analysis to compute the approximate set of objects written by each instruction [4].”
Control Flow Integrity for COTS Binaries (2013, methodology): “Most existing CFI implementations, including those in Native Client [46], Pittsfield [27], Control-flow locking [6] and many other works [22, 3, 42, 4, 36] are implemented within compiler tool chains.”
Jump-oriented programming: a new class of code-reuse attack (2011, background): “DFI [12] and others [5, 13] build on the control-flow integrity property and further extend it for other types of memory safety (e.”
Baggy Bounds Checking: An Efficient and Backwards-Compatible Defense against Out-of-Bounds Errors (2009, background): “Previous work [4, 19, 2] has exploited this property in a variety of ways.”
Out of Control: Overcoming Control-Flow Integrity (2014, background): “Many popular pure SFI frameworks, like for example Native Client [45], [46] or SFI-inspired policy frameworks, like XFI [47] and WIT [48], employ CFI-checks to prevent flows from escaping the sandbox.”
HyperSafe: A Lightweight Approach to Provide Lifetime Hypervisor Control-Flow Integrity (2010, background): “These systems are designed to uncover bugs in the source code [10], [15]; prevent the bug from being exploited [2]; reason about the safety of one facet of the software [9]; or demonstrate the absence of some kind of bugs [17].”
SoK: Eternal War in Memory (2013, background): “Thereported performance overhead of WIT is around 5-25% for the SPEC benchmark.”
Counterfeit Object-oriented Programming: On the Difficulty of Preventing Code Reuse Attacks in C++ Applications (2015, background): “This changed through the broad deployment of the well-known data execution prevention (DEP) countermeasure [33] that renders immediate code injection attacks infeasible.”
Moat: Verifying Confidentiality of Enclave Programs (2015, background): “This assumption is not fundamental, and can be removed using modern runtime defenses (e.g. [3]).”
Practical Control Flow Integrity and Randomization for Binary Executables (2013, methodology): “CFI is also useful as a foundation for enforcing SFI [13], or other higher level policies, such as XFI [14] or write-integrity [40].”
VC3: Trustworthy Data Analytics in the Cloud Using SGX (2015, background): “Our invariants share some properties with recent proposals for efficient execution integrity, such as CPI [34] and WIT [2], but our invariants and enforcement mechanisms are adapted to the enclave environment.”