Robustness of cooperation in the evolutionary prisoner's dilemma on complex networks

By J. Poncela, Jesús Gómez-Gardeñes, Luis Mario Floría, Yamir Moreno. 2007

158 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Recent studies on the evolutionary dynamics of the prisoner's dilemma game in scale-free networks have demonstrated that the heterogeneity of the network interconnections enhances the evolutionary success of cooperation. In this paper we address the issue of how the characterization of the asymptotic states of the evolutionary dynamics depends on the initial concentration of cooperators. We find that the measure and the connectedness properties of the set of nodes where cooperation reaches fixation is largely independent of initial conditions, in contrast with the behaviour of both the set of nodes where defection is fixed, and the fluctuating nodes. We also check for the robustness of these results when varying the degree heterogeneity along a one-parametric family of networks interpolating between the class of Erdős–Renyi graphs and the Barabási–Albert networks.

Subfields: Management Science and Operations Research, Sociology and Political Science, Statistical and Nonlinear Physics

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/5f6afee39162608159b382ce6c076f7474353a6d

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In Management Science and Operations Research

In Sociology and Political Science

In Statistical and Nonlinear Physics

Citations in the corpus

Coevolutionary games - A mini review (2009, background): “…patterns (Rong et al., 2007), memory (Wang et al., 2006) and payoff normalization (Santos and Pacheco, 2006; Masuda, 2007; Wu et al., 2007; Szolnoki et al., 2008b), as well as its robustness in general (Poncela et al., 2007; Chen et al., 2008a) and under intentional attack and error (Perc, 2009).”