Promoting cooperation in social dilemmas via simple coevolutionary rules
By Attila Szolnoki, Matjaz Perc. 2008
228 citations recorded by the source corpus.
We study the evolution of cooperation in structured populations within popular models of social dilemmas, whereby simple coevolutionary rules are introduced that may enhance players abilities to enforce their strategy on the opponent. Coevolution thus here refers to an evolutionary process affecting the teaching activity of players that accompanies the evolution of their strategies. Particularly, we increase the teaching activity of a player after it has successfully reproduced, yet we do so depending on the disseminated strategy. We separately consider coevolution affecting either only the cooperators or only the defectors, and show that both options promote cooperation irrespective of the applied game. Opposite to intuitive reasoning, however, we reveal that the coevolutionary promotion of players spreading defection is, in the long run, more beneficial for cooperation than the likewise promotion of cooperators. We explain the contradictive impact of the two considered coevolutionary rules by examining the differences between resulting heterogeneities that segregate participating players, and furthermore, demonstrate that the influential individuals completely determine the final outcome of the games. Our findings are immune to changes defining the type of considered social dilemmas and highlight that the heterogeneity of players, resulting in a positive feedback mechanism, is a fundamental property promoting cooperation in groups of selfish individuals.
Subfields: Genetics, Safety Research, Sociology and Political Science
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/5e294abea4bc9063c4b1e8f0aab3c2b893eca40b
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Genetics
In Safety Research
In Sociology and Political Science
Citations in the corpus
- Evolutionary game theory: Temporal and spatial effects beyond replicator dynamics (2009, result): “This was pioneered by Harley [150] (see also the book by Maynard Smith [6], where the paper by Harley is presented as a chapter) and a few works have appeared in the last few years [151, 152, 153, 154, 155]; although the available results are too specific to allow for a glimpse of any general featur”
- Coevolutionary games - A mini review (2009, unknown): “…al., 2008; Perc et al., 2008; Chen et al., 2008b; Pestelacci et al., 2008; Van Segbroeck et al., 2008; Fu et al., 2008, 2009b; Kun and Scheuring, 2009; Szolnoki and Perc, 2009c; Tanimoto, 2009a,b; Van Segbroeck et al., 2009; Gräser et al., 2009) (see Section 3.1), the size of the network (or…”