Delegation to International Organizations: Agency Theory and World Bank Environmental Reform

By Daniel L. Nielson, M. Tierney. International Organization, 2003

641 citations recorded by the source corpus.

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The choice for multilateralism: Foreign aid and American foreign policy (2012, positive): “In PA models in international relations, governments are principals who have a choice of whether to delegate policy-making to agents, namely international institutions (Hawkins et al. 2006; Nielson and Tierney 2003; Tierney 2006).”
Making global markets: Historical institutionalism in international political economy (2010, background): “…arguments often focus either on a narrow set of rules governing choice in legislatures or legislative–executive relations, or on the ‘agency slack’ created when legislatures or executives delegate authority under set conditions (Ballmann et al., 2002; Pollack, 2003; Nielson and Tierney, 2003).”
Open-Door or Closed-Door? Transparency in Domestic and International Bargaining (2004, background): “…with open-door bargain- 1+ For several recent discussions that consider issues related to transparency in international organizations, see Keohane 2002; Risse 2000; Nielson and Tierney 2003; Hawkins, Lake, Nielson, and Tierney 2003; Martin 2002; and Jacobsson and Vifell 2003+ 2+ The citation is…”
Principal–agent theory and the World Trade Organization: Complex agency and ‘missing delegation’ (2011, methodology): “The phenomenon of ‘leap-frog’ is described by Nielson and Tierney (2003).”