Intellectual property rights, licensing, and innovation in an endogenous product-cycle model

By Guifang Yang, Keith E. Maskus. 2001

275 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management of Technology and Innovation

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/5a8d618ab32fd6745ce5e086762a84ba23d4ba01

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Economics and Econometrics

1. W. Park
2. Alireza Naghavi
3. Amy Jocelyn Glass
4. Keith E. Maskus
5. Brent B. Allred
6. Lei Yang
7. Yongmin Chen
8. Thitima Puttitanun

In Management of Technology and Innovation

1. W. Park
2. Alireza Naghavi
3. Amy Jocelyn Glass
4. Keith E. Maskus
5. Brent B. Allred
6. Lei Yang
7. Yongmin Chen
8. Thitima Puttitanun

Citations in the corpus

• Intellectual property rights and licensing: An econometric investigation (2001, background): “These ideas have been formalized in a dynamic general equilibrium model with endogenous innovation and licensing to study the effects of stronger intellectual property rights in the South on the incentives of firms in the North to innovate and to license advanced technologies (Yang and Maskus 2001).”
• Intellectual property rights and innovation in developing countries (2005, background): “Second, northern firms may react to the lack of IPRs in the South by making their technologies more difficult to imitate, which can result in less efficient research technology and less northern innovation (Taylor, 1993, 1994; Yang and Maskus, 2001).”
• Intellectual property rights and quality improvement (2007, background): “Yang and Maskus (2001) find that better IPR protection can increase innovation and technology transfer when firms license their technologies.”
• Openness and Technological Innovations in Developing Countries: Evidence from Firm-Level Surveys (2006, unknown): “As in the case of FDI and trade openness, there is evidence that licence transfers are greater in countries with better absorptive capacity (Yang and Maskus, 2001).”
• The Impact of Formal Institutions on Knowledge Economy (2013, unknown): “However, Yang & Maskus (2001) note that, stronger IPRs protection could also reduce the need for FDI, while Andrés (2006), and Goel and Nelson (2009) have found copyright protection and income to be the most determining factors of IPRs in the software industry.”
• Patent rights and innovative activity: evidence from national and firm-level data (2007, background): “In cross-country studies, several works find a positive influence overall of patent protection on trade, FDI, and licensing (Maskus and Penubarti, 1995; Smith, 2001; Yang and Maskus, 2001; Branstetter et al., 2004; Park and Lippoldt, 2005).”
• Strategic Intellectual Property Rights Policy and North-South Technology Transfer (2007, background): “Yang and Maskus (2001) showed that when the channel of diffusion is licensing, both rates of innovation and technology transfer increase due to lower transfer costs and less rent sacrifice for the licensor to prevent imitation by the licensee.”
• Intellectual Property Rights, Technology Transfer and Exports in Developing Countries (2009, background): “These costs typically fall as Southern IPR are tightened because enforceable patents and trade secrets reduce contracting problems under asymmetric information and limit the need for N to masque its proprietary knowledge (Taylor, 1994; Yang and Maskus, 2001).”