The Electronic Mail Game: Strategic Behavior Under "Almost Common Knowledge"
By Ariel Rubinstein. 1989
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
- Christian Schröder de Witt
- Shimon Whiteson
- Wendelin Böhmer
- Angeliki Lazaridou
- Gregory Farquhar
- Jakob N. Foerster
- Philip H. S. Torr
- Tonghan Wang
Citations in the corpus
- Multi-Agent Cooperation and the Emergence of (Natural) Language (2016, background): “Coordination can only occur if the basis of the coordination is common knowledge (Rubinstein, 1989), therefore if we remove some facts from common knowledge, we will preclude our agents from coordinating on them.”
- Multi-Agent Common Knowledge Reinforcement Learning (2018, background): “Rubinstein (1989) shows that any finite number of reasoning steps, short of the infinite number required for common knowledge, can be insufficient for achieving coordination.”
- A Structure Theorem for Rationalizability with Application to Robust Predictions of Refinements (2007, background): “This general approach was promoted by Rubinstein (1989).”
- Arms Races and Negotiations (2004, background): “Rubinstein (1989) and Carlsson and van Damme (1993) show how introducing a small number of dominant strategy types into a coordination game can select a unique Bayesian–Nash equilibrium.”
- The psychology of coordination and common knowledge. (2014, background): “…surrounding the problem of mutualistic coordination.1 We focus on a special kind of representation called common knowledge (sometimes called mutual knowledge or common ground; Clark & Marshall, 1981; Clark, 1996; Lewis, 1969; Pinker, 2007; Rubinstein, 1989; Schelling, 1960; Smith, 1982).”
- Talking Ourselves to Efficiency: Coordination in Inter-Generational Minimum Effort Games with Private, Almost Common and Common Knowledge of Advice (2009, unknown): “Finally, Rubinstein (1989) shows that such results are possible when the players have almost but not complete common knowledge of the payoffs of the game.”
- Incomplete Information in Macroeconomics: Accommodating Frictions in Coordination (2016, unknown): “An important precedent to all these works is Rubinstein (1989), which first highlighted the fragility of coordination to perturbations of common knowledge.”