A Matching Model with Endogenous Skill Requirements

By James Albrecht, Susan Vroman. 2002

410 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/592dbbf0ea1b6610206b5c226cf48f62f165b8f6

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In Economics and Econometrics

Citations in the corpus

On-the-Job Search in a Matching Model with Heterogenous Jobs and Workers (2003, positive): “One strand uses models in the vein of Burdett and Mortensen (1998) to explain how on-the-job search may give rise to wage differentials among identical workers; see Mortensen (2003) for an excellent overview of this literature.”
Overeducation and Mismatch in the Labor Market (2011, positive): “Albrecht and Vroman (2002) proposed a matching model in which on-the-job search is not possible. They show that in that case, two types of equilibria can emerge: highly-educated workers match with skilled and with unskilled jobs, or highly-educated workers refuse to take unskilled jobs. Which of the”
Overeducation at the Start of the Career: Stepping Stone or Trap? (2013, background): “Albrecht and Vroman (2002) developed a matching model in which they show that it may be optimal for skilled workers to accept unskilled jobs as long as the productivity differences between skilled and unskilled jobs are not too large.”
Nonfamily Managers, Family Firms, and the Winner's Curse: The Influence of Noneconomic Goals and Bounded Rationality (2014, background): “Evidence suggests that managers are sorted, in part, by ability (Thaler, 1989), and therefore similar to high-quality employers, high-quality managers have an incentive to signal their ability in order to obtain more attractive and better paying positions (Albrecht & Vroman, 2002; Miyazaki; Spence).”
The Effects of Technical Change on Labor Market Inequalities (2004, positive): “Then, it is easy to see from (17) that as long as τ > α/ (1− α), the experience premium will rise after a technological acceleration, since the loss of vintage-specific human capital incurred by young workers is larger than the productivity improvement embodied in physical capital.”
The returns to skill (2006, background): “, 1997; Shi, 1998; Albrecht and Vroman (1998)) focuses on the general equilibrium configuration of wages for dichotomous workers who are either skilled or unskilled.”
Education and Training in Europe (2007, background): “Recently, Albrecht and Vroman (2002) and Dolado et al. (2004) have shown that mismatch can be a longlasting phenomenon in matching models with jobs and worker heterogeneity, where high skilled workers can compete with low skilled workers for low skilled jobs.”
Firm Dynamics, Job Turnover, and Wage Distributions in an Open Economy (2016, neutral): “Finally, since worker-consumers are risk neutral, consumer i enjoys momentary indirect utility Wi = IiP : (3) 2.”