The Institutional Economics of Foreign Aid: Frontmatter

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Explaining the Gaps between Mandate and Performance: Agency Theory and World Bank Environmental Reform (2005, background): “Notable exceptions include Ostrom et al. 2002; and Martens et al. 2002.”
Proliferation and fragmentation: Transactions costs and the value of aid (2006, background): “…of interactions between single donors and recipients, within the general framework of principal – agent models, and have paid no serious attention to the behavioural implications of the existence of a multiplicity of (competing) donors (Collier et al. 1997, Martens et al. 2002, Ostrom et al. 2002).”
A Political Economy of Aid (2009, background): “Others claim government-to-government aid is the wrong way to dispense assistance because either it leads to corruption in the recipient nation (Knack 2001) and damages long term public nance (Remmer 2004) or it leads to agency problems and bureaucratic ine¢ ciencies which undermine poverty allevia”