A Political Economy of Aid

By B. B. D. Mesquita, Alastair Smith. International Organization, 2009

398 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Development, Economics and Econometrics, Political Science and International Relations

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/634905cb29302a2b3b5e926128f6cfc081eae18d

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In Development

1. Simone Dietrich
2. Faisal Z. Ahmed
3. Richard A. Nielsen
4. S. Bermeo

In Economics and Econometrics

1. Faisal Z. Ahmed
2. Simone Dietrich
3. Richard A. Nielsen

In Political Science and International Relations

1. Faisal Z. Ahmed
2. Simone Dietrich
3. Richard A. Nielsen

Citations in the corpus

• Coding Error or Statistical Embellishment? The Political Economy of Reporting Climate Aid (2011, neutral): “For an overview of various aspects of the recent literature on the political economy of aid, see Lahiri and Michaelowa (2006).”
• Rewarding Human Rights? Selective Aid Sanctions against Repressive States (2013, background): “In developing countries, losing economic aid may challenge the political survival of the recipient regime because these funds are important for satisfying key constituencies (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2009; Kono and Montinola 2009).”
• Foreign Aid and Regime Change: A Role for Donor Intent (2011, neutral): “Dunning (2004) separately examines the cold war and post-cold war periods, plausibly arguing that donor intent with regard to democratization changed with the end of the bipolar power struggle.”
• The Perils of Unearned Foreign Income: Aid, Remittances, and Government Survival (2012, background): “…less politically accountable to their populations, aid can have adverse effects on human development (Knack 2003) and is likely to be wasted on nonproductive activities that will help the government stay in power (e.g., Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2009, 2010; Kono and Montinola 2009; Smith 2008).”
• How Aid Targets Votes: The Impact of Electoral Incentives on Foreign Aid Distribution (2014, neutral): “23 Bueno de mesquita and smith 2007; Bueno de mesquita and smith 2009.”
• Tracking Underreported Financial Flows: China’s Development Finance and the Aid–Conflict Nexus Revisited (2017, neutral): “…of resources governments can shift to deter violence or to buy off potential rebels (Lensink and Morrisey 2000; Arcand and Chauvet 2001; Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2009).24 The latter explanation, that aid volatility reduces the ability of governments to flexibly mobilize resources, is…”
• Bypass or Engage? Explaining Donor Delivery Tactics in Foreign Aid Allocation* (2013, background): “According to Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2009), it would be mere coincidence if bilateral aid would substantially contribute to recipient development: Recipient and donor leaders seek substantive policies and resource allocations that protect their hold on power.”