Prosocial behavior and incentives: Evidence from field experiments in rural Mexico and Tanzania

By J. Kerr, M. Vardhan, Rohit Jindal. 2012

145 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Demography, Economics and Econometrics, Safety Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/58b316f2676fa9e507bcaf035213928821278999

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Demography

1. H. Chun
2. S. Engel
3. E. Gómez‐Baggethun
4. M. Vardhan
5. J. Kerr
6. G. Tomas M. Hult
7. J. Cronin
8. Rohit Jindal

In Economics and Econometrics

1. E. Gómez‐Baggethun
2. E. Corbera
3. S. Engel
4. Kai Ma Chan
5. M. van Noordwijk
6. B. Leimona
7. T. Krause
8. Julian Rode

In Safety Research

1. T. Krause
2. H. Chun
3. S. Engel
4. E. Gómez‐Baggethun
5. M. Vardhan
6. J. Kerr
7. G. Tomas M. Hult
8. J. Cronin

Citations in the corpus

• Motivation crowding by economic incentives in conservation policy: A review of the empirical evidence (2015, background): “community activity compared to no payments (Kerr et al., 2012).”
• Payments for Ecosystem Services: Rife With Problems and Potential—For Transformation Towards Sustainability (2017, background): “Trust, after all, is central in such programs (Goldstein, 2005; Kerr et al, 2012).”
• Problematizing REDD+ as an experiment in payments for ecosystem services (2012, background): “Fisher B, Lewis SL, Burgess ND, Malimbwi RE, Munishi PK, Swetnam RD, Turner RK, Willcock S, Balmford A: Implementation and opportunity costs of reducing deforestation and forest degradation in Tanzania.”
• The Devil in the Detail: A Practical Guide on Designing Payments for Environmental Services (2016, background): “There is evidence in behavioral economics that setting payments too low (below the minimum) can be counterproductive (Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000; Kerr et al., 2012).8 It appears thus important to estimate provision costs to include not only opportunity costs, but also transaction costs (Wünscher…”
• Payments for Environmental Services: Evolution Toward Efficient and Fair Incentives for Multifunctional Landscapes (2012, background): “The theoretical literature on PES cited in this review tends to ignore the challenges of eliciting collective action in a group contract; there is an implied assumption that collective action will take care of itself if the payment is well calibrated (126).”
• Incentives, conditionality and collective action in payment for environmental services (2014, background): “Participation in exchange for payment to the village leadership was high only in one of the five villages, where trust in local leadership was particularly high compared to the others (Kerr et al. 2012).”
• Adjusting the Warm-Glow Thermostat: How Incentivizing Participation in Voluntary Green Programs Moderates Their Impact on Service Satisfaction (2016, background): “In terms of satisfaction outcomes, Kerr, Vardhan, and Jindal (2012) report how villagers in Tanzania experienced lower satisfaction with a voluntary tree planting program when they received a cash payment, compared with when their participation earned a donation for the village school.”