Repeated Games and Reputations

By George J. Mailath, Larry Samuelson. 2006

904 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Management Science and Operations Research, Safety Research, Statistical and Nonlinear Physics

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/58351e0562c62cd5d363ea67811a3a7e89d6b5d2

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In Management Science and Operations Research

In Safety Research

In Statistical and Nonlinear Physics

Citations in the corpus

Games with Imperfectly Observable Actions in Continuous Time (2007, background): “21 Also, the Folk Theorem typically fails in strongly symmetric equilibria that do not use tangent hyperplanes (see Proposition 8.2.1 in Mailath and Samuelson (2006) for the proof of this fact, and Green and Porter (1984) and APS (1986) for analyses of strongly symmetric equilibria).”
History, Expectations, and Leadership in the Evolution of Social Norms (2014, neutral): “In addition, when there are more agents within a generation, the signal that an agent will transmit to the next generation by choosing High is less precise (because the probability that the agent they match with will have seen their signal is 1/n).(23)”
Equilibrium Selection in the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma: Axiomatic Approach and Experimental Evidence (2011, background): “13 For example Mailath and Samuelson (2006) build their motivation for repeated games exactly on”
Private Monitoring and Communication in Cartels: Explaining Recent Collusive Practices* (2011, background): “Substituting (14) into the expected payoff in (11), the problem is to choose a transfer function t (·) to maximize”
Social Norms and the Enforcement of Laws (2017, neutral): “The different approaches to social norms within economics are discussed in Mailath and Samuelson (2006).”
(Mixed) Strategy in Oligopoly Pricing: Evidence from Gasoline Price Cycles Before and Under a Timing Regulation (2009, background): “For example, the folk theorem is a key result of the supergame approach, yet according to Mailath and Samuelson (2006, 73), it “says nothing about behavior.”
Reputation and Status as Motives for War (2014, background): “For a review of the (formal) strategic logic of reputation, see Mailath & Samuelson (2006).”