Entry and asymmetric lobbying: why governments pick losers

By Richard E. Baldwin, Frédéric Robert-Nicoud. 2007

214 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Political Science and International Relations, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/5773320233c13b347dfc9c46c301022e77abca81

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Citations in the corpus

Lobbying, corruption and political influence (2007, unknown): “Solanko (2003), referring to a theoretical extension by Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2002) of the Grossman and Helpman (1994) framework, argues that small and medium firms and those who are “winners” in sectors where entry is relatively easy should be the least likely to lobby.”
Public support to clusters. A firm level study of french 'local productive systems' (2008, background): “Another possible mechanism is provided by Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2007). These authors show that governments often “pick losers”, or more exactly that public subsidies are captured by declining firms because these latter have a greater incentive to lobby for subsidies. We also find that the Frenc”
On the origins of land use regulations: theory and evidence from us metro areas (2013, unknown): “Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2007) show how both ingredients can be simultaneously included in a dynamic stochastic model.”
Are Free Trade Agreements Contagious (2012, unknown): “(See Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud 2007 for a detailed treatment of this political economy effect.)”
The Political Economy of Agricultural and Food Policies: Recent Contributions, New Insights, and Areas for Further Research (2010, background): “Earlier, Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2007) expanded the GH model to explain the support that goes to declining industries by incorporating an asymmetry in the ability of interest groups to appropriate the benefits of lobbying.”
Political Economy of Public Policies: Insights from Distortions to Agricultural and Food Markets (2013, unknown): “…interaction model, in which differences in marginal utility determine political support and induce politicians to implement policies to counter market developments.13 Others focus on interest groups’ unequal ability to appropriate the benefits of lobbying (Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud 2007).”