Eliciting security requirements with misuse cases

By Guttorm Sindre, Andreas L. Opdahl. Proceedings 37th International Conference on Technology of Object-Oriented Languages and Systems. TOOLS-Pacific 2000, 2000

1,147 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Information Systems

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/575879fcaba9d1ff770d71d1ad807a5cae1ca5a0

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Citations in the corpus

DAG-based attack and defense modeling: Don't miss the forest for the attack trees (2013, background): “abuse cases of McDermott and Fox [180] and misuse cases of Sindre and Opdahl [268, 269, 271, 5, 270] which were later extended by Røstad in [244].”
Elaborating security requirements by construction of intentional anti-models (2004, background): “A few proposals have been made recently for extending existing modeling notations to capture attacker features at requirements engineering time - notably, through misuse cases that complement UML use cases [40, 1].”
A survey of approaches combining safety and security for industrial control systems (2015, methodology): “Misuse cases have been used to elicit safety or security requirements [79].”
Secure Tropos: a Security-Oriented Extension of the Tropos Methodology (2007, background): “In addition to the above approaches, a large number of related works comes from close disciplinary areas such as requirements engineering [10, 11] object oriented software engineering [26, 27, 30, 49, 52, 55] and patterns [54].”
Security Requirements Engineering: A Framework for Representation and Analysis (2008, methodology): “For example, McDermott and Fox [54], followed independently by Sindre and Opdahl [70] and elaborated upon by Alexander [1], describe abuse and misuse cases, extending the use case paradigm to undesired behavior.”