Game theory for applied economists

By R. Gibbons. 1992

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Citations in the corpus

Learning with Opponent-Learning Awareness (2017, background): “IMP Gibbons (1992) is a zero-sum game, with per-step payouts shown in Table 2.”
Global and political strategies in deregulated industries: the asymmetric behaviors of former monopolies (2004, background): “12 Conversely, if the game is played repeatedly but the number of periods is finite, then the repeated game has the same Nash equilibrium as the one in the stage game (Gibbons, 1992: 84).”
Team theory, garbage cans and real organizations: some history and prospects of economic research on decision‐making in organizations (2003, background): “…player has the move, (2b) what each player can do at each of his or her opportunities to move, (2c) what each player knows at each of his or her opportunities to move, and (3) the payoff received by each player for each combination of moves that could be chosen by the players” (Gibbons, 1992: 115).”
Settable Systems: An Extension of Pearl's Causal Model with Optimization, Equilibrium, and Learning (2009, background): “An interesting feature of this example is that when the PCM applies, it does so with vectorvalued units rather than the scalar-valued units formally treated by Pearl (2000) or Halpern (2000). The PCM is thus necessarily silent about what happens when components of an agent’s strategy are arbitrarily”
Toward Idealized Decision Theory (2015, methodology): “d by EDT, and is now the modern academic standard decision theory (Arntzenius 2008; Joyce 2012; Ahmed 2012). CDT is used under the guise of “potential outcomes” in statistics (Rubin 1974), economics (Gibbons 1992, chap. 1), and game theory (Tan and Costa Werlang 1988), and implicitly by many modern ”
Optimal incentive-driven design of participatory sensing systems (2013, background): “In Bayesian games [14], information about player characteristics (e.g. payoffs) is incomplete or uncertain.”
Unobservable Investment and the Hold‐Up Problem (2001, background): “Thus, as suggested by Gibbons (1992), in a one-shot interaction, the hold-up problem continues to be extremely costly even with unobservable investment.”
Strategic bidding of transmission-constrained GENCOs with incomplete information (2005, unknown): “The solution of an incomplete game is the Bayesian Nash equilibrium [ 24 ].”