Optimal incentive-driven design of participatory sensing systems
By Iordanis Koutsopoulos. 2013 Proceedings IEEE INFOCOM, 2013
332 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Computer Science Applications, Management Science and Operations Research
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/8f27e45605ddb50f62ef4c3ce31386fef01bcb12
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In Artificial Intelligence
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Citations in the corpus
- Data Collection and Wireless Communication in Internet of Things (IoT) Using Economic Analysis and Pricing Models: A Survey (2016, background): “To prevent such a misreport, the authors in [126] proposed a”
- Incentive Mechanisms for Crowdsensing: Crowdsourcing With Smartphones (2016, background): “For example, Koutsopoulos [19] developed a randomized incentive mechanism to minimize the total payment to the participating users while guaranteeing certain quality of service level.”
- TRAC: Truthful auction for location-aware collaborative sensing in mobile crowdsourcing (2014, background): “Unfortunately, most of existing designs of incentive mechanism [11] [12] have neglected this important dimension of location information in their designs.”
- A Survey on Mobile Crowdsensing Systems: Challenges, Solutions, and Opportunities (2019, background): “Recruitment through incentives: To promote participation and control the rate of recruitment, a set of user incentives can be introduced in MCS [11], [224], [267], [268].”
- Incentives for Mobile Crowd Sensing: A Survey (2016, background): “Koutsopoulos [66] considers a simpler setting, where the users have only one attribute: quality of collected data.”