The Simple Economics of Extortion: Evidence from Trucking in Aceh
By Benjamin A. Olken, P. Barron. Journal of Political Economy, 2009
375 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Sociology and Political Science
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/d7b21a814ce7b4d6701955c55b727ad6fe6b7a38
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Economics and Econometrics
- Rohini Pande
- Michael Callen
- James Long
- Matthew C. Hansen
- Peter V. Potapov
- Stefan Sieber
- Robin Burgess
- Erwin H. Bulte
In Sociology and Political Science
- Rohini Pande
- Michael Callen
- James Long
- Matthew C. Hansen
- Robin Burgess
- Stefan Sieber
- Peter V. Potapov
- Erwin H. Bulte
Citations in the corpus
- Institutional Corruption and Election Fraud: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan† (2015, methodology): “First, as in the important examples provided by Bertrand et al. ( 2007 ) and Olken and Barron ( 2009 ) , we find that corruption limits the ability of governments to correct externalities.”
- Unobservable Selection and Coefficient Stability: Theory and Evidence (2019, background): “As an example, in their work on corruption in trucking routes, Olken and Barron (2009) commented on the stability of the coefficients when trip fixed effects are included.”
- Corruption and firm behavior: Evidence from African ports (2014, neutral): “Olken and Barron (2009) also traces the level of coercive bribes paid by truckers at road posts in Indonesia to the structure of localized markets for corruption.”
- Corruption in Developing Countries (2012, positive): “Olken and Barron (2009) provide direct data on actual bribes in a more prosaic setting: the bribes truck drivers pay to police on their routes to and from the Indonesian province of Aceh.”
- Does bribery in the home country promote or dampen firm exports (2013, background): “Moreover, in many transition economies, governments still have substantial control of key resources such as credit (Barth et al., 2009) and infrastructure (Olken and Barron, 2009).”
- Corruption, investments and contributions to public goods: Experimental evidence from rural Liberia (2014, background): “Sequeira (2012) distinguishes between various approaches to measure corruption, including “direct observation” (e.g. Bertrand et al., 2007; Olken and Barron, 2009), a “forensic economic approach” based on comparing official data and equilibriumpredictions of theoreticalmodels (e.”
- The Political Economy of Deforestation in the Tropics (2012, positive): “…of the logs and the destination in order to transport logs, then increasing the number of districts could increase total bribes and decrease logging, as in Olken and Barron (2009).4 We explore the relationship between the number of jurisdictions and the total cost of logging empirically later.”