Preventing Privilege Escalation
By Niels Provos, Markus Friedl, Peter Honeyman. USENIX Security Symposium, 2003
381 citations recorded by the source corpus.
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/565919855788bfcc7fbaad3006fe0f42c735b333
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
- R. Watson
- T. Jaeger
- R. Sailer
- Jonathan Woodruff
- P. Neumann
- Chia-che Tsai
- Simon W. Moore
- Jonathan Anderson
Citations in the corpus
- Graphene-SGX: A Practical Library OS for Unmodified Applications on SGX (2017, background): “For example, privilege separating a complex application into multiple enclaves may be a good idea for security [40, 44, 49], and replacing particularly expensive operations can improve performance on SGX.”
- PRIMA: policy-reduced integrity measurement architecture (2006, background): “2 We do not define how this is done, but the filtering interfaces in privilege-separated OpenSSH [ 17 ] serve as our motivating example.”
- Improving Host Security with System Call Policies (2003, background): “These layers may include firewalls to restrict network access, operating system primitives like non-executable stacks or application level protections like privilege separation [30].”
- Cyber-physical systems security: Limitations, issues and future trends (2020, unknown): “Therefore, it is important to prevent such escalation from taking place [175], [176].”
- CHERI: A Hybrid Capability-System Architecture for Scalable Software Compartmentalization (2015, background): “Deployed systems commonly employ two approaches: exploit mitigation (which targets attackvector characteristics such as remote code injection [46]), and software compartmentalization (which limits privileges and further attack surfaces available to attackers [25], [41], [27], [53]).”