Institutional Investor Preferences for Corporate Governance Mechanisms

By Brian J. Bushee, Mary Ellen Carter, Joseph J. Gerakos. 2014

253 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/56251588cf45a59f5dffcf6c928cd21192c1eb3d

Citations in the corpus

• Institutional investors and corporate social responsibility (2019, unknown): “Bushee, Carter, and Gerakos (2014) examine the institutional preferences for various corporate governance mechanisms.”
• Institutional Investor Stability and Crash Risk: Monitoring versus Short-Termism? (2013, unknown): “…(1988), Agrawal and Mandelker (1990, 1992), McConnell and Servaes (1990), Bushee (1998), Wahal and McConnell (2000), Hartzell and Starks (2003), Parrino et al. (2003), Ajinkya et al. (2005), Bushee et al. (2008), Janakiraman et al. (2010), Aggarwal et al. (2010, 2011) and Chung and Zhang (2011).”
• Integrated Reporting and Investor Clientele (2015, unknown): “Apart from IR, I also collect data from ASSET4 on governance practices that have been shown to be associated with investor clientele (Bushee, Carter, and Gerakos 2009).”
• The Efficacy of Shareholder Voting: Evidence from Equity Compensation Plans (2012, unknown): “Bushee, Carter, and Gerakos (2010) find evidence that firms with a high level of ownership by governance-sensitive institutions exhibit significant future improvements in shareholder rights, consistent with an effect of shareholder activism.”