Corporate Governance, Idiosyncratic Risk, and Information Flow

By Miguel A. Ferreira, P. Laux. 2007

745 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/55f631ed96bc4010933b037df1af785045631775

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

In Finance

Citations in the corpus

Corporate governance and the information environment: Evidence from state antitakeover laws ☆ (2012, methodology): “An additional variable of interest is idiosyncratic volatility, since this variable captures the flow of private information to the capital markets (Roll, 1988; Ferreira and Laux, 2007).”
Corporate Social Responsibility and Stock Price Crash Risk (2014, neutral): “Ferreira and Laux (2007) suggest that firms’ antitakeover provisions affect the levels of idiosyncratic risk and information flow. Kim et al. (2011a) find that the strength of external monitoring proxied by analyst coverage, institutional”
Independent Director Reputation Incentives and Stock Price Informativeness (2017, methodology): “16 To proxy for arbitrage-motivated investing, we follow Ferreira and Laux (2007) and Armstrong, Balakrishnan and Cohen (2012) and use the Bebchuk et al., (2009) Entrenchment index.”
Corporate social responsibility and corporate cash holdings (2016, methodology): “Second, panel fixed effect estimation methods may result in a substantial loss of information if csr is highly persistent (Guenster et al., 2011). total assets (reta) and diversification (diver) (Ferreira and Laux, 2007; Luo and Bhattacharya, 2009).”
Social Media and Firm Equity Value (2013, methodology): “Following the ﬁrm valuation models widely used in IS, marketing, and accounting literature (Trueman et al. 2000, Brynjolfsson et al. 2002, Ferreira and Laux 2007, Tirunillai and Tellis 2012), we control for a comprehensive set of exogenous covariates.”
Opaque financial reports, R2, and crash risk (2009, background): “Ferreira and Laux (2007) show that firms with fewer anti-takeover provisions display higher trading activity, better information about future earnings in stock prices, and higher levels of idiosyncratic returns.”
Egalitarianism and International Investment (2011, neutral): “The marginal q methodology has been applied in a variety of contexts, including how multinationality connects with corporate budgeting efficiency (Greene, Hornstein, and White, 2009) and how the absence of antitakeover provisions creates incentives to collect private information (Ferreira and Laux, ”