Decentralization and Inflation: Commitment, Collective Action, or Continuity?

By D. Treisman. American Political Science Review, 2000

262 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Political Science and International Relations

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/55905761a071cb12cec72d3a09ea9e40ccd7285f

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Citations in the corpus

Veto players and the structure of budgets in advanced industrialized countries (2004, result): “Positive findings in our empirical analysis will support other policy stability results reported in the literature (Tsebelis (1999) on labor policies , Hallerberg & Basinger (1998) on taxes, Treisman (2000) on inflation, Henisz (2000) on growth).”
A Sequential Theory of Decentralization: Latin American Cases in Comparative Perspective (2005, background): “…State in Close Vote,” The New York Times, February 21, 2005; among others. power to subnational officials and show that it can augment distributional conflicts (Treisman 1999), foster subnational authoritarianism (Cornelius, Eisenstadt, and Hindley 1999), and exacerbate patronage (Samuels 2003).”
The Impact of Fiscal Decentralization: A Survey (2015, unknown): “While Treisman (2000) and Rodden et al. (2003) find no relationship, two other studies show a positive impact when there is devolution of taxing powers to lower tiers.”
Fiscal decentralization, macrostability and growth (2005, methodology): “We follow Treisman (2000) in the specification of our empirical model in that the annual rate of inflation is determined by, among other things, fiscal decentralization, the develop ment of the tax system, the level of economic development, and the openness of the econ omy.”
FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: SPENDING VERSUS REVENUE DECENTRALIZATION (2013, background): “If, as argued by Treisman (2000), decentralization slows inflation in developed countries and inflation reduces growth, estimated effects of FD on economic growth that do not account for inflation are biased”
Political Institutions and Policy Volatility (2004, unknown): “Franzese (2002) and Treisman (2000) find that countries with more veto points have stable levels (either high or low) of government deficits and inflation respectively.”