Veto players and the structure of budgets in advanced industrialized countries
By George Tsebelis, Eric C. C. Chang. 2004
195 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Political Science and International Relations
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/cb035450e80503ad79c7eb00fc0b7fd90f0eb764
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Economics and Econometrics
- Christos Pantzalis
- Chansog Kim
- J. Park
- Tewodaj Mogues
- Christian Breunig
- Marius R. Busemeyer
- Campbell R. Harvey
- Niklas Potrafke
In Political Science and International Relations
Citations in the corpus
- Political Geography and Stock Returns: The Value and Risk Implications of Proximity to Political Power (2012, result): “Moreover, our results can be used to motivate the importance of multiple veto players and their ideological distance for policy stability in political systems (e.g. see Tsebelis and Chang, 2004).”
- What Determines Public Expenditure Allocations? A Review of Theories, and Implications for Agricultural Public Investment (2012, background): “Tridimas (2001) presents a blended model of the benevolent social planner maximizing a social welfare function but also maximizing electoral support by factoring in voters’ preferences over different types of public spending.”
- Fiscal austerity and the trade-off between public investment and social spending (2009, background): “…studying the structure or composition of budgets has become an increasingly important research topic in the last couple of years (Chang 2008; Tsebelis and Chang 2004), most comparative analyses of the determinants of public spending still tend to look at different types of spending…”