How Important is Corporate Governance
By David F. Larcker, Scott A. Richardson, A. Tuna. 2005
171 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/556e87ec9a38ee137bb884bdbb9c7775e46b438b
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Accounting
- K. Hussainey
- Stephen R. Stubben
- Yawen Jiao
- Madonna L. O'Sullivan
- Mary E. Barth
- J. Stewart
- Khaled Aljifri
- Leslie D. Hodder
In Strategy and Management
- Stephen R. Stubben
- K. Hussainey
- Yawen Jiao
- Madonna L. O'Sullivan
- Mary E. Barth
- J. Stewart
- Khaled Aljifri
- Leslie D. Hodder
Citations in the corpus
- Corporate Governance and the Cost of Equity Capital (2004, unknown): “Larcker et al. [2004] note that corporate governance has both direct and indirect effects on firm characteristics.”
- Corporate governance mechanisms and capital structure in UAE (2012, result): “This result supports the ‘active monitoring hypothesis’ of Demsetz (1983) and Shleifer and Vishny (1986) among others, and contradicts the results of Larcker et al. (2004) and Jong et al. (2005).”
- Board of Directors, Audit Committee Characteristics and the Performance of Saudi Arabia Listed Companies (2012, unknown): “(2003), Larcker et al. (2004), and Drobetz et al.”
- Australian evidence on corporate governance attributes and their association with forward-looking information in the annual report (2008, methodology): “Further, using summary categories of corporate governance characteristics has the potential to mask major underlying relationships (Larcker, Richardson, & Tuna, 2005).”
- CEO Reputation and Earnings Quality (2008, unknown): “[2006] and Larcker, Richardson and Tuna [2005] ).”
- Corporate Boards and the Leverage and Debt Maturity Choices (2007, unknown): “Shleifer and Vishny (1986) suggest that large shareholders have incentive to monitor the management.”
- Stakeholder welfare and firm value (2010, methodology): “To separate activist public pension funds from other institutional investors in CDA/Spectrum 13F filings, we collectively identify 20 largest activist public pension funds used in Cremers and Nair (2005), Larcker et al. (2005), and Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007).”
- Fair Value Accounting for Liabilities and Own Credit Risk (2008, methodology): “Lipe (2002) demonstrates how accounting ratios might convey misleadingly positive signals when a firm approaching bankruptcy uses fair value accounting for liabilities. Lipe (2002) concludes that changes in debt value attributable to changes in credit quality should not be recognized. However, the a”