Valuation and Control in Venture Finance
By Andrei A. Kirilenko. 2001
137 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/54a8870b78a33324d77c8ff8e849f61623ddb4f7
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Citations in the corpus
- Design and Renegotiation of Debt Covenants (2009, unknown): “o10 In related papers, Kirilenko (2001) shows that an entrepreneur might relinquish control in order to maintain price noisiness that supports equilibrium trade, while Harris and Raviv (2005) study control allocation within a firm in a setting in which both the CEO and a manager have relevant inform”
- Angel Finance: The Other Venture Capital (2002, background): “Kirilenko(2001) argues that venture capitalists should get more control rights to compensate for information problems .”
- Innovation And Venture Capital Exits (2004, unknown): “Kirilenko (2001) provides a theoretical discussion of venture capital nance and control bene ts. 2Many authors indicate that exit through an IPO has been limited to the most innovative and promising ventures (Gompers, 1995; Cochrane, 2005; Darby and Zucker, 2002; Cumming and MacIntosh, 2003).”
- Contracts and Exits in Venture Capital Finance (2008, unknown): “…Cornelli and Yosha, 1997; Hellmann, 1998; Marx, 1998; Trester, 1998; Bergmann and Hege, 1998; Repullo and Suarez, 1998; Bascha and Walz, 2001a; Kirilenko, 2001; Schmidt, 2001; among others); (3) Research indicating the role of U.S. tax law in biasing the selected security in the U.S. towards…”
- The Determinants of Venture Capital Portfolio Size: Empirical Evidence (2006, unknown): “Both theoretical and empirical research is consistent with the proposition that VCs are value-added investors, typically geographically proximate to their investees, and among the most sophisticated of financial intermediaries at mitigating informational asymmetries and agency costs in financial con”
- Venture Capital and Other Private Equity: A Survey (2011, unknown): “35 (Marx 1998), (Bergemann and Hege 1998),(Trester 1998), (Kirilenko 2001), and (Cornelli and Yosha 2003). value and is afraid of a sale that compensates him insufficiently for their loss; on the other hand, a VC is afraid of a premature, “cheap exit” that results in a poor return on her financial…”
- Preplanned Exit Strategies in Venture Capital (2008, unknown): “Further theoretical work in the spirit of Casamatta and Haritchabalet (2003) and empirical work in the spirit of Lerner (1994), Lockett and Wright (2001), and Gompers (1995) could consider staging and syndication vis-à-vis preplanned exits; those topics are beyond the scope of this paper.”