Auditor resignations: clientele effects and legal liability☆
By Susan Shu. 2000
571 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/50a5b17de82514f20d1610f9ea2a4879ae99787a
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In Accounting
- Jeong‐Bon Kim
- Clive Lennox
- Jere R. Francis
- Jong-Hag Choi
- Mark L. Defond
- Christian Leuz
- Ross L. Watts
- Peter D. Wysocki
Citations in the corpus
- How do Auditors Respond to CEO Narcissism? Evidence from External Audit Fees (2015, unknown): “Shu (2000) discusses”
- Do Financial Restatements Lead to Auditor Changes (2013, background): “For instance, auditors adjust their client portfolios to reduce overall exposure to client litigation by simply resigning from engagements that pose a high litigation risk, for example client-firms that have restatements (Krishnan and Krishnan 1997; Shu 2000).”
- Political Uncertainty and Accounting Conservatism (2013, unknown): “Please refer to Table 3 of Shu (2000) for more details.”
- Does Auditor Tenure Improve Audit Quality? Moderating Effects of Industry Specialization and Fee Dependence (2009, background): “this reputation (Watts and Zimmerman 1983) through litigation exposure (Shu 2000).”
- The Information Role of Conservatism (2008, methodology): “By their nature, growth options (future positive net present value projects) are unverifiable so that information asymmetry between managers and outside investors is expected to be larger, the greater those growth options (Smith and Watts, 1992). Like Smith and Watts (1992) and Gaver and Gaver (1993”
- How Do Various Forms of Auditor Rotation Affect Audit Quality? Evidence from China (2012, background): “a voluntary auditor rotation (Johnson and Lys, 1990; Shu, 2000).”
- Corporate Governance and Firm Value: the Impact of the 2002 Governance Rules (2007, result): “Consistent with this concern, previous research suggests that, on average, auditor switches are considered bad news (e.g., Fried and Schiff (1981), Shu (2000)), and auditors switch firms when the client faces increased litigation risk (e.g., DeFond and Subramanyan (1998), Shu (2000)).”
- Audit Firm Industry Specialization as a Differentiation Strategy: Evidence from Fees Charged to Firms Going Public (2003, methodology): “Prior research (e.g., Johnson and Lys 1990; Shu 2000) suggests a correlation between a change in capital structure (similar to the change caused by an IPO) and a change in audit firm.”
- Does Auditor Quality and Tenure Matter to Investors? Evidence from the Bond Market (2004, unknown): “2 Alternatively, studies on auditor resignations , which typically occur for firms that are in poor financial health, show that resignations have a negative impact on stock prices (see for example Beniesh, Hopkins and Janesn [2001], Shu [2000], DeFond, Ettridge and Smith [1997], and Wells and Loudde”
- Fraud Risk Factor Of The Fraud Triangle Assessing The Likelihood Of Fraudulent Financial Reporting (2011, unknown): “Both Krishnan and Krishnan (1997) and Shu (2000) found that auditor resignation was positively associated with likelihood of litigation.”
- Litigation Risk and IPO Underpricing (2002, background): “Skinner (1995) finds that the threat of litigation potentially alters firms’ disclosure behavior, and Krishnan and Krishnan (1997) and Shu (2000) find that this same threat causes auditors to stay away from risky clients.”
- Investor Sentiment and Corporate Disclosure (2008, unknown): “Kothari, Shu, and Wysocki [2006] present evidence suggesting that managers disclose good news early and delay disclosure of bad news.”
- Estimation and Empirical Properties of a Firm-Year Measure of Accounting Conservatism (2009, methodology): “We use the Shu (2000) measure of the probability of litigation.”