Implementing AES via an Actively/Covertly Secure Dishonest-Majority MPC Protocol

By Ivan Bjerre Damgård, Marcel Keller, Enrique Larraia, Christian Miles, Nigel P. Smart. 2012

74 citations recorded by the source corpus.

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Artificial Intelligence

Citations in the corpus

Prio: Private, Robust, and Scalable Computation of Aggregate Statistics (2017, background): “The generality of MPC comes with serious bandwidth and computational costs: evaluating the relatively simple AES circuit in an MPC requires the parties to perform many minutes or even hours of precomputation [44].”
Multiparty Computation from Somewhat Homomorphic Encryption (2012, background): “These rough orders of magnitude, and the ability to deal with a non-trivial number of players, are born out by a recent implementation of the protocols described in this paper [11].”
A Pragmatic Introduction to Secure Multi-Party Computation (2019, methodology): “Other e cient approaches include Damgård and Zakarias (2013) and Damgård et al. (2017). Various approaches for e ciently generating the authenticated shares needed for the SPDZ approach are discussed by Keller et al. (2016) and Keller et al. (2018). The GMW paradigm transforms a semi-honest-secure p”
Efficient Constant-Round Multi-party Computation Combining BMR and SPDZ (2019, methodology): “• In [10] an actively secure computation of AES using SPDZ took an offline time of over five minutes per AES block, with an online time of around a quarter of a second; that computation used a security parameter of 64 as opposed to our estimates using a security parameter of 128.”
Efficient, Oblivious Data Structures for MPC (2014, background): “[8,9] for the finite fields GF(2) and GF(p), respectively.”
MASCOT: Faster Malicious Arithmetic Secure Computation with Oblivious Transfer (2016, methodology): “In contrast, security of the SHE scheme used in SPDZ is based on the ring learning with errors assumption, which is still relatively poorly understood — it is possible that new attacks could surface that render the protocol totally impractical for secure parameters.”
Practical Covertly Secure MPC for Dishonest Majority - Or: Breaking the SPDZ Limits (2013, methodology): “In the case of covert security the authors of [12] report figures of 0.”