Tax base variability and procyclical fiscal policy in developing countries

By Ernesto Talvi, C. Végh. 2005

738 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/5075d25d3a5637f627b6826a84de82945ec14504

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Economics and Econometrics

Citations in the corpus

Procyclical Fiscal Policy in Developing Countries: Truth or Fiction? (2008, background): “…Mendoza and Oviedo (2006), and Susuki (2006)); and (b) political economy explanations typically based on the idea that good times encourage scal pro igacy and/or rent-seeking activities: (Tornell and Lane (1998, 1999), Talvi and Végh (2005), Alesina and Tabellini (2005), and Ilzetzki (2007)).”
Rent seeing distortions and fiscal procyclicality (2011, background): “Talvi and Végh (2005) show that political distortions based on Tornell and Lane s (1999) "voracity e¤ect" may cause procyclical policies.”
The Natural Resource Curse: A Survey of Diagnoses and Some Prescriptions (2012, background): “28 Cuddington (1989), Gavin and Perotti (1997), Tornell and Lane (1999), Kaminsky, Reinhart, and Vegh (2004), Talvi and Végh (2005), Alesina, Campante and Tabellini (2008), Mendoza and Oviedo (2006), Ilzetski and Vegh (2008) and Medas and Zakharova (2009).”
How is Tax Policy Conducted over the Business Cycle? (2015, methodology): “…ranging from limited access to international credit markets (Riascos and Vegh, 2003, Cuadra, Sanchez, and Sapriza, 2010) to political distortions and institutional weaknesses that tend to encourage excessive public spending during boom periods (Tornell and Lane, 1999, Talvi and Vegh, 2005).”
Why Do More Polarized Countries Run More Procyclical Fiscal Policy? (2009, methodology): “Some studies use the correlation of cyclical components of a fiscal variable and output that are first filtered by the Hodrick-Prescott method (Gavin and Perotti 1997, Talvi and Vegh 2005, Kaminsky et al. 2004 among others).”
Investment Cycles and Sovereign Debt Overhang (2007, neutral): “Several recent studies have documented the significant pro-cyclicality of fiscal policy in emerging markets (Gavin and Perotti, 1997; Kaminsky, Reinhart and Vegh , 2004; Talvi and Vegh, 2005).”
Flexible Fiscal Rules and Countercyclical Fiscal Policy (2016, background): “…Such constraints are critical for tackling the root causes of fiscal profligacy, including notably issues related to polarized social preferences (Talvi and Végh, 2005; and Woo, 2009), conflicts of interest between political parties (Alesina and Tabellini, 1990), agency problem between voters…”
Are Bilateral Remittances Countercyclical? (2011, neutral): “11 Talvi and Végh (2005), Gavin and Perotti (1997), Alesina et al. (2008).”
Current Account Balances, Financial Development and Institutions: Assaying the World "Savings Glut" (2007, neutral): “…to the variables mentioned in the text, we also tested the dummy for countries with plural political systems; government fragmentation (both from DPI 2004); political constraint, or democracy, index (from Henisz, 2000); and the standard deviation of tax revenues (following Talvi and Vegh, 2005).”
Fiscal policy responsiveness, persistence, and discretion (2010, neutral): “…countries (Fiorito and Kollintzas 1994; Galí 1994; Fiorito 1997; Hallerberg and Strauch 2002; Sorensen et al. 2001; Afonso and González Alegre 2008; Afonso 2008) while it is pro-cyclical in developing countries (Gavin and Perotti 1997a, 1997b; Braun 2001; Kaminsky et al. 2004; Talvi and Vegh 2005).”
Targeting the Structural Balance (2007, neutral): “Talvi and Végh (2005) present an optimizing behavior model that introduces a political distortion, which raises the cost of running surpluses in good times.”
Global Current Account Imbalances: American Fiscal Policy versus East Asian Savings (2008, neutral): “…to the variables mentioned in the text, we also tested the dummy for countries with plural political systems; government fragmentation (both from DPI 2004); political constraint, or democracy, index (from Henisz, 2000); and the standard deviation of tax revenues (following Talvi and Vegh, 2005).”