Incentive Regulation and Competition in Public Utility Markets: A 20-Year Perspective

By Ingo Vogelsang. 2002

278 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Electrical and Electronic Engineering, Management Science and Operations Research, Media Technology

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/5068cea70abc7a329fddff9b88e979d0357d1880

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Electrical and Electronic Engineering

1. Mark Armstrong
2. Carlo Cambini
3. D. E. Sappington
4. Laura Rondi

In Management Science and Operations Research

1. Carlo Cambini
2. Laura Rondi
3. Mark Armstrong
4. D. E. Sappington
5. P. Joskow
6. Daniel Montolio
7. Néstor Duch
8. Francesc Trillas

In Media Technology

1. Mark Armstrong
2. Carlo Cambini
3. D. E. Sappington
4. Laura Rondi

Citations in the corpus

• Recent developments in the theory of regulation (2007, background): “7 4See Crew and Kleindorfer (2002) and Vogelsang (2002) for critical views regarding the practical relevance of the recent optimal regulation literature.”
• Regulation, Competition and Liberalization (2005, background): “…production costs,34 an SOE may operate with higher costs than a privately-owned monopoly.35 Therefore, liberalization may have greater potential to reduce industry costs when the incumbent monopoly supplier is owned primarily by the government than when it is owned primarily by private investors.36”
• Incentive regulation and investment: evidence from European energy utilities (2010, methodology): “The theoretical framework for our analysis draws on the literature that studies the implications of different forms of regulation for capital investment decisions (Crew and Kleindorfer, 1996 and 2002; Vogelsang, 2002; Joskow, 2008).”