Framing moral intuitions.
By Walter Sinnott-Armstrong. 2008
161 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Cognitive Neuroscience, Education, Information Systems and Management
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/4f51bae595023b99009028a1adb0bf7c2f176ed8
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Cognitive Neuroscience
- Wesley Buckwalter
- Kevin Patrick Tobia
- Stephen Stich
- Adam Feltz
- Leland F. Saunders
- Yasmina Okan
- Alex Wiegmann
- Jonas Nagel
In Education
- Leland F. Saunders
- Yasmina Okan
- Alex Wiegmann
- Stephen Stich
- Adam Feltz
- Jonas Nagel
- Thomas Nadelhoffer
In Information Systems and Management
- Leland F. Saunders
- Yasmina Okan
- Alex Wiegmann
- Stephen Stich
- Adam Feltz
- Jonas Nagel
- Thomas Nadelhoffer
Citations in the corpus
- The Actor–Observer Bias and Moral Intuitions: Adding Fuel to Sinnott-Armstrong’s Fire (2008, background): “In a series of recent papers, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong has used findings in social psychology to put pressure on intuitionists [29, 30, 31].”
- Order effects in moral judgment (2012, background): “Do our findings support the claim that moral judgment can be unstable and subject to biases (Sinnott-Armstrong, 2008; Swain, Alexander, & Weinberg, 2008)?”
- What is moral reasoning? (2015, background): “…Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001), and that people’s responses to moral dilemmas are subject to framing and ordering effects (for an overview, see Sinnott-Armstrong, 2008).3 While this research has done much to illuminate the causal role of emotions in moral judgment (though it leaves many…”
- Moral intuitions: Are philosophers experts? (2013, background): “Philosophers commonly characterize a moral intuition as ‘‘a strong immediate moral belief’’ (Sinnott-Armstrong, 2008, p. 47) or ‘‘a spontaneous moral judgment’’ (McMahan, 2000, p. 94).”