Coevolution of dynamical states and interactions in dynamic networks.

By Martín G. Zimmermann, Víctor M. Eguíluz, M. San Miguel. Physical review. E, Statistical, nonlinear, and soft matter physics, 2004

462 citations recorded by the source corpus.

We explore the coupled dynamics of the internal states of a set of interacting elements and the network of interactions among them. Interactions are modeled by a spatial game and the network of interaction links evolves adapting to the outcome of the game. As an example, we consider a model of cooperation in which the adaptation is shown to facilitate the formation of a hierarchical interaction network that sustains a highly cooperative stationary state. The resulting network has the characteristics of a small world network when a mechanism of local neighbor selection is introduced in the adaptive network dynamics. The highly connected nodes in the hierarchical structure of the network play a leading role in the stability of the network. Perturbations acting on the state of these special nodes trigger global avalanches leading to complete network reorganization.

Subfields: Public Health, Environmental and Occupational Health, Sociology and Political Science, Statistical and Nonlinear Physics

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/4f1e1d362b2a311b0da9021c407ae3f4098aebd5

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Citations in the corpus

Social network theory: new insights and issues for behavioral ecologists (2009, background): “Social scientists have done some analyses combining game theory and SNT (Skyrms and Permantle 2000) built, for example, around the prisoner’s dilemma (Ebel and Bornoldt 2002; Zimmerman et al. 2004).”
Adaptive coevolutionary networks: a review (2007, background): “This observation triggered a number of subsequent studies which will be discussed in the next section.”
Evolutionary games on graphs (2006, background): “In (Zimmermann et al., 2004; Equíluz et al., 2005) the network adaption rule was altered to favor the choice of second neighbors (the neighbors of the D neighbor who are companions in distress) with another probability p when selecting a new partner.”
Critical phenomena in complex networks (2007, background): “We expect that models of this kind will attract much interest in the future, see works of Caldarelli et al. (2006); Ehrhardt et al. (2006); Gil and Zanette (2006); Kozma and Barrat (2007); Zanette (2007); Zimmermann et al. (2004), and the review of Gross and Blasius (2007).”
Coevolutionary games - A mini review (2009, unknown): “…richest-following (or ‘learning from the best’) rule (Abramson and Kuperman, 2001; Hu et al., 2007; Wu et al., 2007), where the focal player always imitates the strategy of its most successful neighbor (Zimmermann et al., 2004; Equı́luz et al., 2005; Li et al., 2007; Tanimoto, 2007a, 2009b).”
Evolutionary game theory: Temporal and spatial effects beyond replicator dynamics (2009, background): “This promising idea has already been proposed [138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145] and a number of interesting results, which would deserve a separate review on their own right(7), have been obtained regarding the emergence of cooperation.”