When Do Firms Hire Lobbyists? The Organization of Lobbying at the Federal Communications Commission
By J. de Figueiredo, James J. Kim. 2004
222 citations recorded by the source corpus.
This paper examines the explanatory power of transaction cost economics to explain vertical integration decisions for lobbying by firms. We examine 150 lobbying contacts at the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) on the issue of payphone compensation for dial-around calls. When firms lobby on topics that are highly firm-specific and prone to sensitive-information leakage, they are more likely to use employees to lobby the FCC. However, when topics arise that are more general to the industry and do not include sensitive information, firms are more likely to use outside counsel to lobby the FCC.
Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/4ed6a86134d0c73304a166dc339f3531e54b4627
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Accounting
In Strategy and Management
Citations in the corpus
- A Review of the Value Relevance Literature (2009, background): “In the case of losses, Joos and Plesko [76] find that investors separately value the R&D component as an asset and the non-R&D component as if it were a transitory loss.”
- Market valuation of greenhouse gas emissions under a mandatory reporting regime: Evidence from the UK (2017, background): “Furthermore, the coefficient f variable EPSxLOSS is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level, which is consistent with Joos and Plesko (2005), ho show that the earnings valuation coefficient of loss-making firms is significantly lower than that of profit-making firms.”
- Value Relevance of Accounting Information Under an Integrated Reporting Approach: A Research Note (2016, unknown): “Additionally, we control for differences in the relevance of earnings coefficients of loss-making firms (Baboukardos & Rimmel, 2014; Hayn, 1995; Joos & Plesko, 2005) by incorporating a binary variable which takes the value of one for loss-making firms and zero otherwise and we allow it to interact…”