In Defense of Unanimous Jury Verdicts: Mistrials, Communication, and Strategic Voting

By Peter J. Coughlan. American Political Science Review, 2000

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EPISTEMIC DEMOCRACY WITH DEFENSIBLE PREMISES1 (2013, background): “Estlund et al. 1989) and, of course, the link between the CJT and epistemic conceptions of democracy (Cohen 1986, Gaus 1997, List and Goodin 2001, Estlund 2008). A link between the CJT, judgement aggregation and social epistemology is offered by Bovens and Rabinowicz (2006) and List (2005). Several ”
Committee Design with Endogenous Information (2004, methodology): “As a nice byproduct of this restriction we get that the equilibria in our simultaneous voting game are also equilibria in a sequential version of the voting game (see Dekel and Piccione, 2000, Theorem 4).”
Information Aggregation in Polls (2008, neutral): “Somewhat related to our work is a literature studying polls prior to elections (see, for instance, Austen-Smith 1990; Fey 1997; and Coughlan 2000).”
AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF COLLECTIVE DELIBERATION (2011, background): “Coughlan (2000) and Austen-Smith and Feddersen (2005, 2006 ) were among the …rst to point out that the availability of particular communication protocols 3 can dramatically alter collective decisions, while Gerardi and Yariv (2007) show that unrestricted communication (such as jury deliberation)…”