Social Choice and Multicriterion Decision-Making
By Kenneth J. Arrow, H. Raynaud. 1986
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
- Felix Brandt
- Jérôme Lang
- Vincent Conitzer
- U. Endriss
- J. Martínez-Alier
- Ariel D. Procaccia
- J. O’Neill
- Nardo Michela
Citations in the corpus
- Noncompensatory/nonlinear composite indicators for ranking countries: a defensible setting (2009, methodology): “These authors discard the Kemeny median order, on the grounds that preference reversal phenomena may occur inside this approach (Arrow and Raynaud, 1986, p. 96).”
- On the Methodological Framework of Composite Indices: A Review of the Issues of Weighting, Aggregation, and Robustness (2018, unknown): “Similar to the issue of a non-existent perfect weighting scheme, there is no such thing as a ‘perfect aggregation’ scheme (Arrow 1963; Arrow and Raynaud 1986).”
- Multiple Criteria Decision Analysis and Sustainable Development (2005, methodology): “These authors discard what they call the Kemeny’s method, on the grounds that preference reversal phenomena may occur inside this approach ( Arrow and Raynaud, 1986, p. 96 ).”
- Constructing Consistent Composite Indicators: the Issue of Weights (2005, methodology): “Vansnick (1990) showed that the two main approaches in multi-criteria aggregation procedures i.e., the compensatory and non-compensatory ones can be directly derived from the seminal work of Borda and Condorcet.”
- Social multi-criteria evaluation: Methodological foundations and operational consequences (2004, methodology): “The attempt of looking for a complete set of formal axioms that can be attributed to a specific method (e.g., Arrow and Raynaud, 1986; Vincke, 1994).”
- Visions, Values, Valuation, and the Need for an Ecological Economics (2001, background): “Although they are in some senses independent criteria (Arrow and Raynaud 1986), they must all be satisfied in an integrated fashion to allow human life to continue in a desirable way.”
- A new monotonic, clone-independent, reversal symmetric, and condorcet-consistent single-winner election method (2011, unknown): “Prudence as a criterion for single-winner election methods has been popularized mainly by Arrow and Raynaud (1986). This criterion says that the strength λ d of the strongest link ef that is not supported by the binary relation Ö, should be as small as possible.”
- Weak Comparability of Values as a Foundation for Ecological Economics (1998, background): “The consequence is that a complete axiomatization of multicriteria decision theory is quite difficult (Arrow and Raynaud, 1986).”