The Political Economy of Budget Deficits

By Lori L. Leachman, G. Rosas, Peter Lange, Alan Bester. 2007

278 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Political Science and International Relations

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/4c3e319d4aeaea392c566231e7ed878aaa6cec40

Citations in the corpus

Fiscal policy responsiveness, persistence, and discretion (2010, unknown): “We also ﬁnd that a lower level of political party concentration in the government leads to greater discretion, since proportional systems lead to coalitions and ﬁscal deadlocks which delay stabilizations and increase the discretionary component of spending (as argued by Alesina and Perotti 1994).”
The Determinants of Local Government's Financial Transparency (2011, unknown): “Alesina and Perotti (1995) state that opportunistic politicians, who seek re-election, take advantage of this confusion by raising spending more than taxes in order to please the ‘fiscally illuded’ voter.”
Politicians, Taxes, and Debt (2010, unknown): “For related work on the political economy of debt, see Aghion and Bolton (1990), Alesina and Perotti (1994), Alesina and Tabellini (1990), Lizzeri (1999) and Persson and Svensson (1989).”
Fiscal Policy Challenges in Oil-Exporting Countries - A Review of Key Issues (2009, unknown): “Later literature has increasingly looked at specifi c features of democratic systems that are particularly conducive to unsound fi scal policies, such as individual election systems and the degree of political polarisation (see, for instance, Roubini and Sachs (1989), Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabelli”
How Should Subnational Government Borrowing Be Regulated? Some Cross-Country Empirical Evidence (2005, unknown): “This gap, filled by 4 See Alesina and Perotti (1995) for empirical evidence and discussion. federal transfers from centralized tax revenues, is referred to as a vertical fiscal imbalance, usually measured as the ratio of transfers to total subnational government revenue.”