How Should Subnational Government Borrowing Be Regulated? Some Cross-Country Empirical Evidence
By A. Plekhanov, R. Singh. Social Science Research Network, 2005
122 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Countries have adopted various institutional responses to subnational government borrowing. Using a sample of 44 countries 1982-2000, this paper provides a panel data analysis to determine the most effective borrowing constraints for containing local fiscal deficits. The results suggest that no single institutional arrangement is superior under all circumstances. The appropriateness of specific arrangements depends upon other institutional characteristics, particularly the degree of vertical fiscal imbalance, the existence of any bailout precedent, and the quality of fiscal reporting.
Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics, Political Science and International Relations
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/07b9c46edaf4234fc016ca82199a176c24e69ac1
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Citations in the corpus
- Developing by borrowing? Inter-jurisdictional competition, land finance and local debt accumulation in China (2017, background): “…leads to vertical fiscal imbalance and thereafter results in the so-called ‘common-pool resource’ and ‘soft budget constraints’ problems (Kornai, 1986; Ostrom, 1990), since local governments tend to overspend and rely on central transfers to pay off their debts (Singh and Plekhanov, 2005).”