Decentralization, Hierarchies, and Incentives: A Mechanism Design Perspective

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Technology, Information and the Decentralization of the Firm (2006, background): “As emphasized by Mookherjee (2006), however, the presence of complete contracts in these models implies that delegation can at best replicate the constrained efficient allocation, which is also achievable by centralized contracting.”
Knowledge, Compensation, and Firm Value: An Empirical Analysis of Firm Communication (2014, neutral): “…and Scharfstein (1998), Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (1999), Garicano (2000), Dessein (2002), Dewatripont and Tirole (2005), Harris and Raviv (2005, 2008, 2010), Mookherjee (2006), Van den Steen (2010), and Ferreira and Sah (2010). i.e., the person communicating is the person with the information.”
Does Flattening Government Improve Economic Performance (2015, neutral): “Organization structure involves a trade-offbetween horizontal coordination and vertical control (Mookherjee, 2006).”
When Does Coordination Require Centralization (2006, neutral): “We can also use (41) to evaluate dΠC/dλ for λ = 1/2: dΠC dλ = −(4) 3 (δ1 + δ2) 1 + 2 (δ1 + δ2) σ(2).”