Principal-agent problems in international organizations
By R. Vaubel. 2006
231 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Political Science and International Relations
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/4a466763c990714b21d2e6bfb6024846d41dfc5d
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Economics and Econometrics
- Axel Dreher
- Valentin Lang
- Nathan M. Jensen
- Manfred Elsig
- Niklas Potrafke
- Muhammad Shahbaz
- J. Vreeland
- Quan Li
In Political Science and International Relations
- Axel Dreher
- Valentin Lang
- Nathan M. Jensen
- Manfred Elsig
- Diego F. Hernández
- Christopher Kilby
- R. Stone
- Andreas Bergh
Citations in the corpus
- IMF conditionality: theory and evidence (2008, unknown): “For principal agent problems in international organizations, see also Vaubel (2006).”
- Money Makes the EU Go Round: The Objective Foundations of Conflict in the Council of Ministers (2015, unknown): “However, interest groups might work hard against the attempts of some Member States to raise the costs of their rivals by increasing the standards of environmental regulation (Vaubel, 2006).”
- The economics of the democratic deficit: The effect of IMF programs on inequality (2016, background): “…like maximizing budgets, responsibilities, and autonomy, and find that IMF officials are able to push for longer programs, larger loans and more far-reaching conditionality than what is economically optimal (Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Copelovitch 2010; Lang and Presbitero 2018; Vaubel 2006).”
- Independent Actor or Agent? An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of U.S. Interests on International Monetary Fund Conditions (2007, background): “Vaubel (2006) provides an excellent survey on principal-agent problems in international organizations.”
- Principal–agent theory and the World Trade Organization: Complex agency and ‘missing delegation’ (2011, background): “…has exhibited an ‘anti-agent bias’ (Thompson, 2006) and has emphasized the principal side.5 In the standard PA models, the underlying assumptions apply a stereotype of opportunistic agency behaviour explained by the existence of asymmetric information (Niskanen, 1971; Ross, 1971; Vaubel, 2006).”