Optimal income tax in the presence of status effects

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Conspicuous conservation: The Prius halo and willingness to pay for environmental bona fides (2014, background): “…since Veblen (1899) have relied on status-seeking motives to explain anomalies in consumption behavior like upward sloping individual demands and “non-additive” market demands (Leibenstein, 1950; Frank, 1985; Glazer and Konrad, 1996; Ireland, 1998, 2001; Barclay and Willer, 2007).”
The GDP paradox (2009, methodology): “See further Frank (1985, 2004), Ireland (2001) and Layard (2005) for a number of examples of alterations in economic policy that are in line with replacing the GDP indicator by information obtained from the subjective-empirical welfare literature: e.g. regulatory taxation of working overtime and…”
When the Joneses’ consumption hurts : Optimal public good provision and nonlinear income taxation (2008, background): “Exceptions are Oswald (1983), Tuomala (1990) and Ireland (2001) ; however, none of these innovative studies addresses public good provision.”
Running to Keep in the Same Place: Consumer Choice as a Game of Status (2004, background): “Ireland (2001) recently has also investigated the possibility of Pareto improving taxes in the presence of concern for status.”