How does competition impact bank risd-taking?

By Gabriel Jiménez Zambrano, Jose A. Lopez, Jesús Saurina Salas. 2010

366 citations recorded by the source corpus.

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Competitive conditions in Islamic and conventional banking: A global perspective (2010, methodology): “…the seminal article by Keeley (1990), many studies show that competition encourages moral hazard in banking (Hellmann, Murdock, and Stiglitz, 2000; Jimenez, Lopez, and Saurina, 2007), but a counter trend provides theoretical predictions and empirical evidence that more market power might result…”
Finance-Growth Nexus and Dual-Banking Systems: Relative Importance of Islamic Banks (2016, background): “The extant literature shows the influence of domestic interest rates on banks’ risk appetite (Dell’ Ariccia and Marquez, 2006; Rajan, 2006; Borio and Zhu, 2008; Delis and Kouretas, 2010; Maddaloni and Peydró, 2011; Jiménez et al., 2013).”
Regulations, competition and bank risk-taking in transition countries (2008, methodology): “10 For details on these crises, see Laeven and Valencia (2008). 11 Note that it may also be the case that as bank failures increase, the resulting higher degree of concentration in the industry does not necessarily imply more market power for surviving banks.”
Financial liberalization and bank risk-taking: International evidence (2014, background): “Kaminsky and Schmukler (2008) show that liberalization is followed by large financial cycles in the short run only in emerging economies whereas institutions improve and financial markets tend to stabilize in the long run.”