The Value of Voting Rights to Majority Shareholders: Evidence from Dual Class Stock Unifications
By Shmuel Hauser, Beni Lauterbach. 2000
115 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/47777a79b52692c166eb6349173ebfca70146136
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Accounting
- Raphael Amit
- Belén Villalonga
- María‐Andrea Trujillo
- Alexander Guzmán
- S. Lee
- Mike Burkart
- A. Michiels
- Vincent Molly
In Strategy and Management
- Belén Villalonga
- Raphael Amit
- Vincent Molly
- Mike Burkart
- A. Michiels
- Christoph Zott
- G. Bascle
- Richard A. Bettis
Citations in the corpus
- One Share, One Vote: The Empirical Evidence (2007, unknown): “Hauser and Lauterbach (2004) study 84 dual-class stock unifications in Israel.”
- Governance of Family Firms (2015, background): “Sometimes they are explicitly compensated for the value of their voting rights in cash, stock, or options (Hauser & Lauterbach 2004).”
- One Share - One Vote: The Theory (2007, background): “…is that the parties are neither inclined to reveal their information nor to bargain voluntarily due to the inherent redistribution.36 Any speci c procedure is likely to be biased in favour of one or the other party (Bergström and Rydqvist, 1990; Bigelli et al., 2007; Hauser and Lauterbach, 2004).”
- Financing Decisions in Family Businesses: A Review and Suggestions for Developing the Field (2017, background): “(2008) Equity Asymmetric information between shareholders Supply FB/NFB Italy Voordeckers and Steijvers (2006) Debt Asymmetric information between shareholders and bondholders Supply FB/NFB Belgium Waisman (2013) Debt Asymmetric information between shareholders and bondholders Supply FB/NFB USA Walk”