Institutional Allocation in Initial Public Offerings: Empirical Evidence

By Rajesh K. Aggarwal, Nagpurnanand R. Prabhala, Manju Puri. 2002

360 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/47355d3aaa20e8b516606b36a0cc46a01f84f322

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Citations in the corpus

Media Sentiment and IPO Underpricing (2017, positive): “Consistently with this view, Aggarwal et al. (2002) show that institutional investors earn greater returns than retail investors. The magnitude of underpricing is not only related to the amount of available information around the IPO process but also to the precision (quality) of the information dis”
IPO Research in Management and Entrepreneurship: Moving the Agenda Forward (2009, neutral): “Although individual investors sometimes form a small part of the investor network in a typical IPO, firms typically allocate an overwhelming majority of the equity available in IPOs to institutional investors (Aggarwal et al., 2002; Hanley & Wilhelm, 1995).”
Equity crowdfunding: a systematic review of the literature (2018, neutral): “…capital markets (e.g., stock markets, microloan markets, donation, and reward-based crowdfunding), it is known that late investors are influenced by the behavior of early investors (see, e.g., Welch 1992; Aggarwal et al. 2002; Zhang and Liu 2012; Kuppuswamy and Bayus 2015; Burtch et al. 2013).”
Litigation Risk, Strategic Disclosure and the Underpricing of Initial Public Offerings (2012, neutral): “As most IPO investors are institutional investors (Hanley and Wilhelm, 1995; Cornelli and Goldreich, 2003; Aggarwal, Prabhala, and Puri, 2002; Ljungqvist and Wilhelm, 2002; Jenkinson and Jones, 2004), the expectation of greater litigation success provides an additional motivation as to why issuers…”
Allocation of initial public offerings and flipping activity (2003, neutral): “2For example, see Aggarwal (2000), Aggarwal and Conroy (2000), Aggarwal et al. (2001), Benveniste and Busaba (1997), Ellis Katarina et al. (2000), Krigman et al. (1999), Logue et al. (2002), Benveniste et al. (1996), Hanley et al. (1996), Hanley et al. (1993), Chowdhry and Nanda (1996), Benveniste…”
Are IPO Allocations for Sale? Evidence from Mutual Funds (2006, neutral): “are consistent with those in Aggarwal et al. (2002) and suggest that mutual funds as a group earn above-average first-day returns on their IPO allocations, whether measured by equal-weighted average returns (36.”
The Role of Institutional Investors in Initial Public Offerings (2010, neutral): “While it has been documented (see, e.g.,Aggarwal, Prabhala, and Puri 2002;Hanley and Wilhelm 1995) that institutional investors receive significant allocations in underpriced IPOs (where a considerable amount of money is “left on the table”), the ability of institutions to fully realize this money…”
The Role of Institutional Investors in Seasoned Equity Offerings (2009, neutral): “Previous studies show that institutional investors tend to get more allocations in more underpriced IPOs (see, e.g., Aggarwal, Prabhala, and Puri, 2002).”
Affiliated Mutual Funds and the Allocation of Initial Public Offerings (2007, neutral): “21 funds, as well as other institutional investors, are able to pick IPOs with better first-day performance (Aggarwal et al., 2002), or because they are favored or better informed due to”
IPO Underpricing Over the Very Long Run (2009, neutral): “While Cornelli and Goldreich (2001, 2003) and Aggarwal, Prabhala and Puri (2002) , and also”
Are share price levels informative? Evidence from the ownership, pricing, turnover and performance of IPO firms (2004, neutral): “Hanley and Wilhelm (1995), Aggarwal et al. (2002) and Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003) indicate that the institutional investment in an IPO averages about 60–75%, and Aggarwal (2003) shows that institutions flip about 25% of the shares allocated to them.”
Investors’ choices between cash and voting rights: Evidence from dual-class equity crowdfunding (2019, neutral): “With institutional investors being allocated the largest fraction of IPO shares (Aggarwal et al., 2002), crowdfunding investors are likely to be more 4”