Investors’ choices between cash and voting rights: Evidence from dual-class equity crowdfunding

By Douglas J. Cumming, M. Meoli, Silvio Vismara. Research Policy, 2019

222 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Abstract This paper examines for the first time dual-class equity crowdfunding as a digital ownership model. Unique to this context, companies can set an investment threshold under which no voting rights are granted, making the issuance of Class A vs. Class B shares, depending on individual investors. Using a sample of 491 offerings on the UK platform Crowdcube from 2011 to 2015, we find that a higher separation between ownership and control rights lowers the probability of success of the offering, the likelihood of attracting professional investors, as well as the long-run prospects. Different from small investors, professional investors care about the implementation of a threshold for the attribution of voting rights and often bid the Class A threshold exactly. Family businesses, although less attractive to small investors, are relatively safer investments, because of their lower chances of failure.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics, Management Information Systems

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/e75c3f14383a6ec243d8d4f4ff3911f4982606d1

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In Accounting

  1. E. Stam
  2. Tom Vanacker
  3. Xavier Walthoff‐Borm
  4. Mike Wright
  5. Armin Schwienbacher
  6. F. Polzin
  7. Maryann P. Feldman
  8. Satish Nambisan

In Economics and Econometrics

  1. E. Stam
  2. Tom Vanacker
  3. F. Polzin
  4. Xavier Walthoff‐Borm
  5. Wanxiang Cai
  6. Satish Nambisan
  7. Maryann P. Feldman
  8. Mike Wright

In Management Information Systems

  1. Tom Vanacker
  2. F. Polzin
  3. Xavier Walthoff‐Borm
  4. E. Stam
  5. Mike Wright
  6. Wanxiang Cai
  7. Satish Nambisan
  8. Maryann P. Feldman

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