Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games

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Discovering Diverse Multi-Agent Strategic Behavior via Reward Randomization (2021, background): “This is related to the problem of equilibrium reﬁnement (or equilibrium selection) (Selten, 1965; 1975; Myerson, 1978), which aims to ﬁnd a subset of equilibria satisfying desirable properties, e.g., admissibility (Banks & Sobel, 1987), subgame perfection (Selten, 1965), Pareto efﬁciency (Bernheim…”
Time and Space: Why Imperfect Information Games are Hard (2018, background): “For example, the sequential equilibrium [52], the (normal form) trembling hand equilibrium [77], and the quasi-perfect equilibrium [89] guarantee rational play.”
On time-inconsistent stopping problems and mixed strategy stopping times (2018, unknown): “The approach was further developed by Selten [37, 38] who introduced the notion of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, which is a reﬁnement of the Nash equilibrium suitable for dynamic games.”