Time and Space: Why Imperfect Information Games are Hard
By Neil Burch. 2018
49 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Management Science and Operations Research, Sociology and Political Science
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Artificial Intelligence
- Sergey Levine
- Jakob N. Foerster
- Yoshua Bengio
- Pieter Abbeel
- R´emi Munos
- Karl Tuyls
- Adam Lerer
- Marc Lanctot
In Management Science and Operations Research
- Neil Burch
- Noam Brown
- Marc Lanctot
- Karl Tuyls
- Tuomas Sandholm
- Michael H. Bowling
- Jakob N. Foerster
- Adam Lerer
In Sociology and Political Science
- Jakob N. Foerster
- Noam Brown
- Adam Lerer
- Neil Burch
- Tuomas Sandholm
- Marc Lanctot
- Michael H. Bowling
- Viliam Lisý
Citations in the corpus
- The Hanabi Challenge: A New Frontier for AI Research (2019, background): “s another challenging dimension of complexity for AI algorithms. As has been observed in domains like poker, imperfect information entangles how an agent should behave across multiple observed states [17, 18]. In Hanabi, we observe this when thinking of the policy as a communication protocol 7 betwe”
- Rethinking Formal Models of Partially Observable Multiagent Decision Making (2019, background): “However, for the purpose of CFR-D, this type of subgame is sufficient [7].”
- Deep Counterfactual Regret Minimization (2018, background): “However, most of these faster variants of CFR do not handle approximation error well (Tammelin et al., 2015; Burch, 2017; Brown & Sandholm, 2019; Schmid et al., 2019).”
- Joint Policy Search for Multi-agent Collaboration with Imperfect Information (2020, background): “This decomposition issue in IG have been addressed in many previous works (e.g., CFR-D [8, 7], DeepStack [29], Reach subgame solving [4]), mainly in the context of solving subgames in a principled way in two-player zero-sum games (like Poker).”
- Neural Replicator Dynamics (2019, background): “2b, in every iteration, each information-state policy over the entire game was updated for both players in an alternating fashion, i.e., the first player’s policy was updated, then the second player’s [13, Section 4.3.6] [14].”